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Religious Associational Rights and Sexual Conduct in 
South Africa: Towards the Furtherance of the 
Accommodation of a Diversity of Beliefs 
Shaun de Freitas* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Michel Rosenfeld speaks of a radical post-modern attack on the 
Enlightenment tenet, namely the clear separation between the realm 
of reason and that of faith. The post-modern challenge builds on the 
“disenchantment of reason” associated with the perception that 
reason as the means to the implantation of a universally justified 
rational order gives way to purely instrumental reason (the use of 
reason for purposes of advancing the narrow interests of the 
powerful).1 With the rise of religion and also the disenchantment of 
reason, religion finds more room to project its truth as absolute and 
exclusive.2 This gives way to the realization that, just as there are 
different beliefs, there are also different forms of reason coupled to 
these different beliefs. Human rights protection includes the 
necessity to agree upon certain fundamentals. This, however, should 
not negate circumstances that allow for a more sensitive and 
accommodative approach regarding a diversity of supportive 
arguments pertaining to moral matters. In this regard, how we 
understand concepts such as “equality,”3 “human dignity”4 and 
 
 * Professor of Law, Department of Constitutional Law and Philosophy of Law, 
University of the Free State, South Africa. The author would like to thank Iain Benson for 
comments on a previous draft. An earlier version of this article was delivered as a paper at the 
Nineteenth Annual International Law and Religion Symposium, held on October 7–9, 2012 at 
the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University. 
 1. Michel Rosenfeld, Introduction: Can Constitutionalism, Secularism and Religion Be 
Reconciled in an Era of Globalization and Religious Revival?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2333, 2335 
(2009). 
 2. Id. at 2336. 
 3. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 29–30 
(2010); ROGER TRIGG, EQUALITY, FREEDOM, AND RELIGION 152 (2012). 
 4. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 3, at 177–82. 
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“freedom”5 may differ from believer to believer and from one group 
of believers sharing the same core beliefs to another group of 
believers sharing the same core beliefs. For example, there are those 
of the view that equality necessitates that religious associations may 
not deny membership to persons practicing same-sex sexual 
conduct, even where such conduct is in violation of the core tenets of 
such associations. However, such an understanding of equality does 
not enjoy universal support (or universal persuasion). Society is 
composed of many sub-communities of various institutional kinds, 
and the liberty of these many sub-communities to exist and to 
operate according to the kinds of communities they are should be 
protected.6 
Johan van der Vyver recently commented that there is much 
stress placed on the self-determination of religious associations 
regarding their internal functioning. Van der Vyver adds that: 
“Religious perceptions and practices that have lost touch with the 
times can best be remedied through deliberation and persuasion; 
legal coercion in matters of faith is bound to be counterproductive.”7 
Van der Vyver made this statement in the context of current 
approaches in German jurisprudence where the labor courts are only 
required to take account of the effect of the dismissal of an employee 
on his or her personal and family life and to ask whether the 
consequences of the employee’s conduct with regard to the spiritual 
calling of the church was of such a nature as to justify the negative 
effects his or her dismissal would have on his or her personal and 
family life or religious freedom.8 The reference here to “deliberation 
and persuasion” as trumping “legal coercion” poses challenges 
towards qualifying the parameters of appointments by, and 
membership to, religious associations. Will persuasion always be 
possible? Should persuasion always be required? Are there not 
 
 5. Id. at 27–28; see also TRIGG, supra note 3, at 139. 
 6. STEVEN M. TIPTON, PUBLIC PULPITS: METHODISTS AND MAINLINE CHURCHES IN THE 
MORAL ARGUMENT OF PUBLIC LIFE 435–36 (2007). 
 7. Johan D. van der Vyver, State Interference in the Internal Affairs of Religious Institutions, 26 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 9 (2012). 
 8. Id. at 9. This is, according to van der Vyver, due to the influences from approaches 
taken by the European Court of Human Rights relating to the dismissal of church employees for 
sexual conduct considered by the respective churches to be violations of those churches’ core 
doctrines. Id. at 1–2. 
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different forms of persuasion that oppose one another on moral 
matters? Who should be persuaded? 
According to Nicholas Rescher, the empirical basis of our factual 
knowledge is bound to cultivate different forms of “alternative 
cognitive positions through the variation of experience,” which in 
turn leads to rational inquiries of different results.9 It is therefore 
normal that people with different experiences should judge 
differently with respect to issues that are not in themselves very 
simple,10 and for this reason, dissensus and pluralism overrides the 
quest for consensus.11 These alternative cognitive positions which 
include rational inquiries of different results are also represented by 
religious associations. With reference to Canadian and South African 
jurisprudence, it has been commented that the legal claims for 
accommodation that are not viewed as challenging the lexical 
superiority of “constitutional religion” itself, stand a fair chance of 
success. However, this is in contrast to the substantial reluctance of 
the judiciary (and the legislature) to accept as authoritative any 
potentially competing legal order that originates in sacred sources of 
authority.12 Stephen Carter comments that the liberal image of the 
religiously devout citizen seems to be one of an individual whose 
 
 9. NICHOLAS RESCHER, PLURALISM: AGAINST THE DEMAND FOR CONSENSUS 76–77 (1993). 
Rescher adds that as long as people think themselves to have good reason for making different 
assessments, consensus (however attractive) is not realistic—“This normality of dissensus of 
values, ideals, aims, and aspirations prevails among people, engenders a pluralism in cognitive, 
practical, doctrinal, and even political regards, which in turn inheres in the human condition.” 
Id. at 132. 
 10. Id. at 77. 
 11. Id. at 125–26. This quest for consensus is also found in the strand of liberalist 
thinking that views toleration as an instrument of rational consensus (where the diversity of 
ways of life is endured in the faith that it is destined to disappear). In this regard, John Gray 
states  
Liberalism contains two philosophies. In one, toleration is justified as a means to 
truth. In this view, toleration is an instrument of rational consensus, and a diversity 
of ways of life is endured in the faith that it is destined to disappear. In the other, 
toleration is valued as a condition of peace, and divergent ways of living are welcomed 
as marks of diversity in the good life. The first conception supports an ideal of 
ultimate convergence on values, the latter an ideal of modus vivendi. Liberalism’s 
future lies in turning its face away from the ideal of rational consensus and looking 
instead to modus vivendi. 
JOHN GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM 105 (2000). 
 12. Ran Hirschl & Ayelet Shachar, The New Wall of Separation: Permitting Diversity, 
Restricting Competition, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2535, 2536 (2009). 
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moral knowledge proceeds from a privileged insight that others do  
not or cannot share.13 The same applies to points of view by 
religious associations on moral matters. 
This therefore directly impacts the rights of religious 
associations in the context of the rationale by such associations to 
prohibit employment or membership of persons who practice sexual 
conduct that is in opposition to the tenets of such associations. This 
in turn has implications for the flourishing of diversity in pluralist 
and democratic societies. South African scholarship poses questions 
as to whether same-sex sexual conduct should be accommodated 
(whether by means of membership or appointments) within 
religious associations where the core belief (or beliefs) of such 
associations prohibit same-sex sexual conduct by its members or 
appointees. This forms part of the challenges confronting many 
religious associations due to a more diversified polity, which 
increases the risk of flattening out the confessional and theological 
integrity of particular churches into what Steven Tipton refers to as 
the “moral Esperanto of legal procedures [and] ‘rights talk.’”14 
Bearing the above in mind, this Article addresses the importance 
of religious associational rights, also with special reference to the 
South African jurisprudential context. This is due to a recent 
development in the South African judiciary where the services of an 
appointee to a religious association were terminated by the 
association due to the appointee participating in same-sex sexual 
conduct, such conduct being in violation of the core doctrine of the 
religious association. After having looked at the various South 
African scholarly approaches in this regard, this article emphasizes 
 
 13. Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 941–42 
(1989). Carter also states that  
Many people who are religiously devout derive at least large parts of their world view 
from an epistemology that is very different from the materialist epistemology on 
which empirical morality depends. So the problem of thinking of scientism as a 
neutral mediating force is that the effort to turn moral questions into empirical ones 
actually devalues some modes of thinking—particularly the religious mode . . . The 
current liberal message to people whose moral judgments have religious roots is that 
they are not welcome in public dialogue until they start speaking the same language 
as everyone else. 
Stephen L. Carter, Lecture One: The Uses of Empiricism and the Uses of Fanaticism, 69 OR. L. REV. 
471, 492–93 (1990). 
 14. TIPTON, supra note 6, at 44, 284. 
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the importance of allowing for a substantial level of autonomy 
pertaining to religious associational rights. Following on this, critical 
perspectives on the relationship between the arguments presented 
by religious associations in qualification of their activities (which 
includes the parameters allowed for membership and appointments) 
and the persuasive force of such arguments in the context of rational 
requirements and expectations are presented. The assumed 
superiority of a point of view that arises from a non-religious point 
of departure over a point of view that is based on a religious point of 
departure is questioned. Accepting the view that a proper degree of 
autonomy should be awarded to the religious association to function 
as it deems fit is of much assistance towards the accommodation of 
the reasons for such functioning. At the same time, bringing to light 
the rationality of a religious association’s reason for acting in the 
way it does provides us with a renewed sense of the autonomy to be 
granted to a religious association in its functioning. These insights 
are of importance to the improvement of diversity in pluralist and 
democratic societies. 
II. RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONTEXT 
A. Associational Rights as Foundational 
Associational rights (with special focus on religious associations, 
which are important constituents of civil society15) overlap with 
interests and concerns supportive of the accommodation of diversity 
within society.16 More sensitivity towards religious associational 
 
 15. Justice Sachs, of the South African Constitutional Court, acknowledges the 
importance of religious associations as part of civil society:  
[R]eligion provides . . . a framework for . . . social stability and growth. . . . 
Religious bodies play a large and important part in public life, through schools, 
hospitals and poverty relief programmes. They command ethical behaviour from their 
members and bear witness to the exercise of power by state and private agencies; they 
promote music, art and theatre; they provide halls for community activities, and 
conduct a great variety of societal activities for their members and the general public. 
They are part of the fabric of public life, and constitute active elements of the diverse 
and pluralistic nation contemplated by the Constitution. . . . Religious 
organisations constitute important sectors of national life. 
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, [2005] ZACC 19, ¶¶ 89–90 (CCT) (S. Afr.). 
 16. Maurizio Viroli speaks of a culture of citizenship that is cultivated not by means of 
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rights leads to a more nuanced insight of the different forms of 
rationality in society, each of these forms providing a unique 
interpretation of certain foundational concepts. Not to do so will 
result in a large sector of civil society having to compromise and in 
the process having its freedom and identity weakened. This is 
important, bearing in mind that religion is not only a set of doctrines 
and exercises; it is people manifesting a collective concern for the 
ultimate meaning and purpose of life—it is a shared intuition of and 
commitment to transcendent values.17 Religion is not only 
individual and private; in many instances religion exists in 
communities, and individuals are members of wider religious 
communities.18 Civil society represents a plethora of morally-driven 
interests and exchanges based on specific beliefs, and it includes 
different forms of persuasion (to selected individuals and groups of 
individuals sharing the same core beliefs) in justification of certain 
 
universal political principles applied to specific cultures, not by dispersing particular cultures 
throughout a common universal political frame, not by strengthening the cultural homogeneity 
of different groups, but by encouraging many civic traditions within different groups. MAURIZIO 
VIROLI, REPUBLICANISM 102 (Anthony Shugaar, trans., Hill & Wang 2002) (1999). See also 
WILLIAM JOHNSON EVERETT, GOD’S FEDERAL REPUBLIC: RECONSTRUCTING OUR GOVERNING SYMBOL 
19 (1988); TIPTON, supra note 6, at 430–31; William Galston, Religion and the Limits of Liberal 
Democracy, in RECOGNIZING RELIGION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN PLURALISM, RELIGION, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 41, 49 (Douglas Farrow ed., 2004); Terrance Sandalow, A Skeptical Look at 
Contemporary Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 523, 535 (1989); Danie F.M. Strauss, Public Justice: 
Delimiting the Task of Government in the Thought of Dooyeweerd and Chaplin, 44 J. FOR CHRISTIAN 
SCHOLARSHIP 157, 176 (2008). 
 17. John O. Cole, Symposium: The Secularization of the Law, 31 MERCER L. REV. 401, 403 
(1980). Max Stackhouse comments that faith inevitably articulates a “‘metaphysical-moral 
vision’ about what is ‘really real.’ If taken at all seriously, it serves as a guide to meaningful 
living. It shapes, over time, the ethos, that subtle web of values, meanings, purposes, 
expectations, obligations, and legitimations that constitutes the publicly operating norms of a 
civilization.” Max Stackhouse, An Ecumenist’s Plea for a Public Theology, 8 THIS WORLD, 
Spring/Summer 1984, at 49. This in turn is of relevance for the protection of human dignity. 
Human dignity as including psychological significance, is violated when there are attacks on 
personal beliefs and ways of life, as well as attacks on groups and communities with which 
individuals are affiliated. Respect for the intrinsic worth of a person requires a recognition that 
the person is entitled to have his or her beliefs, attitudes, ideas and feelings. Coercive measures 
(including psychological) to change personal beliefs is, according to Oscar Schachter, as striking 
an affront to the dignity of the person as physical abuse or mental torture. Oscar Schachter, 
Editorial Comment: Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 850 (1983). See 
also Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion 
Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 295 (2008); Robert P. George, Religious Liberty and the Human Good, 
5 INT’L J. REL. FREEDOM 35, 39 (2012). 
 18. TRIGG, supra note 3, at 47. 
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actions taken by the constituent parts of civil society. The protection 
of the autonomy of the entities comprising civil society results in 
sensitivity to the rationale used by such entities in qualifying certain 
modes of conduct.19 In fact, the converse is also true. This is 
especially true for religious associations, where the qualification of 
prohibitions on appointments by, and membership to, religious 
associations of persons practicing same-sex sexual conduct, where 
such practices are contrary to the core doctrine of such associations, 
are concerned. Appreciating the merits of religious reasoning results 
in sensitivity to the autonomy of the religious association that 
presents such reasoning. The value of this understanding for the 
flourishing of interests (individual and associational) within civil 
society is substantial, and the law has its role to play in this regard in 
that it derives its authority from the premise that “it strives to 
anticipate and give expression to what people believe to be their 
collective destiny or ultimate meaning within a moral universe.”20 
The ideal for a flourishing of diversity21 includes the recognition of 
specific religious modes of understanding, which in turn nourishes 
identity, self-realization and expression. 
When appointments by, and membership to, religious 
associations are not carried out in accordance with the wishes of a 
 
 19. A sensitivity to different modes of rationality (including religious modes) providing 
added sensitivity towards the accommodation of the autonomy of religious associations will be 
further elaborated upon in the second part of this Article. An in-depth analysis regarding 
theories related to the qualification of the inherent or foundational importance of associational 
rights (for example ideas emanating from the communitarian school of thinking or ideas related 
to sphere sovereignty or the inherent importance of the idea of subsidiarity) does not form part 
of the purpose of this Article. Current scholarship on associational rights is in dire need of a 
reconsideration of such schools of thought, where associational rights are viewed as an ultimate 
subject of moral value, just as liberalism supports the view that the individual is the ultimate 
subject of moral value. See, e.g., DWIGHT NEWMAN, COMMUNITY AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS: A 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RIGHTS HELD BY GROUPS (2011). It suffices for purposes of this 
article (as stated earlier) to accept that associational rights, especially those related to religious 
associations, are of fundamental importance (and are widely supported). 
 20. RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 256 (1984). 
 21. Needless to say, calls for the flourishing of society beg the question as to why 
diversity should be valued, especially where it counters claims made by historically 
disadvantaged groups. See Stu Woolman, On the Fragility of Associational Life: A Constitutive 
Liberal’s Response to Patrick Lenta, 25 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 280, 286 (2009). This article is 
based on the assumption that diversity is important and deems a further analysis in this regard 
to be irrelevant to its purposes. 
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collectivity of persons believing in the same core views on reality, 
existence, and purpose, then we find some or other negative effect 
countering the eternal pursuit of an ideal attainment of diversity. 
Collectivities understood as the bearers of meaning22 have their 
meaning disrupted in instances where membership or appointments 
are enforced from the outside, along lines of reasoning that are not 
always in line with those of the religious association. 
Against the background of the South African context, Lourens du 
Plessis comments that the South African Constitution “leaves ample 
room for the protection of the right to religious freedom as a group 
right.”23 There were important judgments of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa regarding the right to religious freedom that 
gave a libertarian and individualist meaning to such a right, although 
this need not imply a negation of any institutional issues related to 
such a right.24 Ran Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar observe that South 
Africa is one of the most accommodating jurisdictions in the world 
regarding cultural diversity. However, “[w]hereas the South African 
Constitutional Court has been more sympathetic to the claims of 
difference than most of its counterparts worldwide, even such a 
generous accommodation regime reaches its limits of toleration 
 
 22. Woolman, supra note 21, at 296. 
 23. Lourens M. du Plessis, Grondwetlike beskerming vir godsdiensregte as groepsregte in Suid-
Afrika, 43 NGTT 214, 214, 228 (2002). See also Stuart Woolman, Freedom of Association, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 62 (Woolman ed., since 2002). Referring to the South 
African Constitutional Court’s case of Prince v. President, Cape Law Society 2002 (2) SA 794 
(CC), Woolman comments that the minority judgment recognizes how associations are 
constitutive of the beliefs and practices of individuals and how the fact of their being 
constitutive entitles them to constitutional protection. Id. at 63. 
 24. Du Plessis, supra note 23, at 228 (note that this article was published in 2002). Since 
2002, the next landmark case on religious rights and freedoms was MEC for Education v. Pillay, 
[2007] ZACC 21 (CCT) (S. Afr.). In this case, nothing substantial was stated regarding the 
importance of associational rights, and Chief Justic Langa continued in the emphasis of the 
individualist sense of religious rights. See, e.g., Pillay, [2007] ZACC at ¶ 143. However, Chief 
Justice Langa also states that:  
By including religion in section 31, the Constitution makes plain that when a group of 
people share a religious belief, that group may also share associative practices that 
have meaning for the individuals within that religious group. . . . In the case of an 
associative practice, an individual is drawing meaning and identity from the shared or 
common practices of a group. The basis for these practices may be a shared religion, a 
shared language or a shared history. Associative practices, which might well be 
related to shared religious beliefs, are treated differently by the Constitution because 
of their associative, not personal character. 
Id. at ¶ 145. 
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when it encounters a challenge to its overarching reign over law’s 
empire.”25 South Africa’s human rights jurisprudence has a 
substantial individualist approach that includes an emphasis on 
religion as an “individual” (and private) thing.26 Referring to the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, Stu Woolman comments that 
in fifteen years, the Court has never decided a case solely, or even 
largely, in terms of freedom of association—“[a]nd that says quite a 
lot about where, in our hierarchy of rights, freedom of association is 
located.”27 
As stated earlier, an emphasis on, and prioritization of, religious 
associational rights allows for more sensitivity towards the 
accommodation of diverse forms of rationalization and persuasion, 
each of which is based on a specific underlying belief. Claims in 
support of associational rights are inextricably connected to claims of 
persuasive reasoning held by the religious, and as reflected in the 
core tenets of a religious association. Claims for the flourishing of 
diversity include support for the accommodation of different forms 
of reasoning so as to qualify certain modes of functioning by, among 
others, religious associations.28 But how important are associational 
rights really? 
Associational rights, understood as foundational to the 
functioning of a pluralist and democratic society, have, for example, 
enjoyed much support in terms of the principle of subsidiarity,29 
 
 25. Hirschl & Shachar, supra note 12, at 2541–42. 
 26. This is similar to, for example, the position in Canada. According to the Ontario 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, most judgments have failed to give a proper recognition to the 
group dimension of religious liberty in Canada. Also according to the said conference, a proper 
contextual reading and understanding of the purpose and nature of the values of the Canadian 
Charter should have led to an interpretation that accords with maximal involvement of religious 
projects both in the public sphere and as a group activity. IT Benson (Lawyer for the Intervener), 
Factum for the Intervener, Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops, (Jan. 23, 2009), Ontario 
Human Rights Commission and Connie Heintz (Respondents) and Christian Horizons 
(Appellant) and Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops (Intervener); Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice (Divisional Court), Court File No. 221/08, paragraph 45, page 21. The same is also the 
case in the American jurisprudential milieu. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 17, at 286, 291. 
 27. Woolman, supra note 21, at 296. Ever since these comments by Woolman were made, 
the position remains unchanged. For some critical remarks on the Canadian judiciary pertaining 
to an emphasis on individual rights (to the exclusion of group rights) in religious matters, see 
TRIGG, supra note 3, at 49. This has implications for the South Africa Constitutional Court’s 
approach to such matters, as Canadian jurisprudence enjoys authority in that court. 
 28. Rationality and its connection to religious associations are dealt with later on. 
 29. This is the view that the smaller should not be dominated by the larger (the larger 
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which is the assistance of the state towards having other entities in a 
society achieve their legitimate purposes.30 This emphasis on the 
importance of associational rights is further enhanced by views 
pertaining to the law in a pluralist society, as well as by insights 
related to the nature of the private versus the public and how the 
individual’s human dignity relates to this. Margaret Davies, for 
example, is of the view that pluralism includes the understanding 
that the hierarchy of the law should be flattened—the law should be 
viewed as a complex horizontal as well as vertical structure.31 Also, 
says Davies, the spatial diversity of law is to be found in an 
irreducibly plural multicultural landscape, in non-essential social 
groupings, and in the formation of identities in relation to such 
multiple normative environments.32 It is true that in popular and 
legal-professional circles, law is generally defined as a body of norms 
promulgated and enforced by the state. However, according to social 
scientists, both public and private domains also produce their own  
 
 
exists so as to further the proper functioning of the smaller) which is translated into 
constitutional theory as an understanding that the state is posited as the entity that is to help 
the smaller or lesser entities (for example, the entities of civil society). 
 30. See Stephen V. Monsma, The Relevance of Solidarity and Subsidiarity to Reformed 
Social and Political Thought 4 (Paper Prepared for the International Society for the Study of 
Reformed Communities, July 9–12, 2006), available at 
http://www.calvin.edu/henry/ISSRC/Conferences/Papers/monsma06.pdf. Regarding the 
importance of sphere sovereignty (which is a concept similar in meaning to that of subsidiarity), 
see id. at 4–6. 
 31. Margaret J. Davies, Pluralism in Law and Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION IN 
THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 72, 72, 94 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2008). 
 32. D. Cooper cited in Davies, supra note 31, at 94. Referring to Robert Cover’s Nomos and 
Narrative, Davies refers to the associations of  
normative meaning inhabited by religious sectarian communities . . . each 
constructs its own nomos . . . The state is one element of such a nomos, but not 
necessarily the most significant . . . State law is interpreted through religious 
norms: thus, a plurality of possible meanings arises from law’s intersection with 
various normative worlds and subject-positions. It is the task of legal officials, in 
particular judges, to contain this plurality. 
Id. at 94. See also id. at 96–97. Referring to the Canadian position, Benjamin Berger states that 
law  
is not a cultural understanding of religion. It does not seek to understand religion as 
an interpretive horizon, composed of sets of symbols and categories of thought, out of 
which meaning can be given to identity, history, and experience. Instead, it moulds 
religion to the shape of its own set of normative and symbolic commitments.  
Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 277, 310–11 (2007). 
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distinctive norms—bodies of law, which the state may acknowledge 
and enforce, or alternatively, refuse to recognize or even tolerate. 
In its post-modern formulation, this theory of “legal pluralism” 
holds that law need not originate with or be enforced by the state; 
that law is imminent in all social and economic relations; and that 
state law ought to be respectful of non-state normative systems, 
which express the “otherness” of those who inhabit the plethora of 
private and public domains that exist in any society or polity.33 This 
understanding of the plurality of the law also has relevance to our 
understanding of pluralism as something that is to be “structural” or 
“shared.” Iain Benson states that: 
Pluralism can connote a kind of relativistic approach, as in “because 
we are a pluralistic society, such and such a moral position cannot 
have any public validity.” It does not have to mean this, however, 
and . . . our linkage of a language of pluralism with a firm 
commitment to group rights, for example, points us to a principled, 
and what might be called structural or shared pluralism, rather than 
one that is relativistic or, perhaps, totalistic.34 
When dealing with religious associations, for example, as part of 
civil society, it is important to note that religion viewed as that 
which should be relegated to the private sphere also has implications 
for how we understand religious associational rights. Iain Benson 
comments that if we are looking to discuss the relationship between 
religion and other aspects of society, we must be careful to avoid 
setting up false dichotomies. Religion discussed “in relation to the 
state or within society” is a far cry, says Benson, from the frequently 
used “religion and the state.” Benson explains that when we use the 
“state” to mean the order of government and the law, and “society” 
to mean citizens at large, including both religious and non-religious 
citizens, we must remember that religion, in some sense, is within 
both, since religious and non-religious citizens make up both the 
state and society.35 It is in this regard that caution is required 
 
 33. Harry Arthurs, The Re-Constitution of the Public Domain, in THE MARKET OR THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN? GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ASYMMETRY OF POWER 85, 86–110 (Daniel Drache ed., 
2001). 
 34. IAIN T. BENSON, LIVING TOGETHER WITH DISAGREEMENT: PLURALISM, THE SECULAR, AND 
THE FAIR TREATMENT OF BELIEFS IN CANADA TODAY 3 (2010) [hereinafter LIVING TOGETHER WITH 
DISAGREEMENT]. 
 35. Iain T. Benson, The Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada: Challenges and 
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regarding a too general and frequent usage of “public” versus 
“private” when it comes to religious rights. In many instances, the 
“private-religious” extends itself into the “public-belief” domain, 
becoming a participant and representative of a specific belief in the 
various areas of reality, which may include other participants and 
representatives of other beliefs. If religion is understood as being 
outside of the public sphere, then it is likely that it will be given a 
different emphasis. On the other hand, if beliefs (including those 
that are religious) are understood as being part of the public sphere 
(due to their inextricable connection to the individual in his or her 
activities in a private or public context), then the relevance of 
religion takes on a whole new dimension.36 This implies therefore 
that religious associations also are to be viewed as part and parcel of 
the public sphere, which in turn implies an acceptable level of 
freedom for the manifestation of religion in the public sphere. 
Richard Garnett comments that the importance of religious 
associational rights finds confirmation in the individual’s freedom to 
freely express and manifest his or her religion—“from the free-
exercise or conscience rights of individual persons.”37 
 
Opportunities, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 111, 155 (2007). 
 36. Benson states: “In fact, all citizens are ‘in’ the public sphere and to characterize 
religion as ‘outside’ the public perpetuates the error of anti-religious secularism—an ideology 
that, from its inception intended to minimize the public space and involvement of religious 
beliefs and religious projects.” Factum for the Intervener, Ontario Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, 23 January 2009, Ontario Human Rights Commission and Connie Heintz (Respondents) and 
Christian Horizons (Appellant) and Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops (Intervener); Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice (Divisional Court), Court File No. 221/08, paragraph 40, page 18. See 
also LIVING TOGETHER WITH DISAGREEMENT, supra note 34, at 9; Iain T. Benson, Taking Pluralism 
and Liberalism Seriously: The Need to Re-Understand Faith, Beliefs, Religion, and Diversity in the Public 
Sphere, 23 J. STUDY REL. 17, 22–25 (2010). 
 37. Garnett, supra note 17, at 293, 295. See also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 116, 118–19, 158 
(1989). Richard Moon states that religious belief lies at the core of the individual’s world view. 
Richard Moon, Freedom of Religion under the Charter of Rights: The Limits of State Neutrality, 45 
U.B.C. L. REV. 497, 507 (2012). This belief orients the individual in the world and provides a 
moral framework for his or her actions. Id. Moreover, religious belief ties the individual to a 
community of believers and is often the essential or defining association in her or his life. Id. In 
the words of Moon,  
If religion is an aspect of the individual’s identity, then when the state treats his or 
her religious practices or beliefs as less important or less true than the practices of 
others, or when it marginalizes her or his religious community in some way, it is not 
simply rejecting the individual’s views and values, it is denying her or his equal 
worth. 
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Associational rights therefore remain important, especially in the 
context of the furtherance of diversity in societies where the 
improvement of pluralism and democracy remain high on the 
agenda. The importance of associational rights is also furthered in 
the understanding (as referred to above) that the spatial diversity of 
law is to be found in an irreducibly plural multicultural and multi-
faith environment, in non-essential social groupings, and in the 
formation of identities in relation to such multiple normative 
environments. Added to this is an understanding of the private 
versus the public domains as more integrated with one another, also 
in the context of the protection of the individual’s human dignity, 
which includes the experience and manifestation of religious belief 
(both within and outside of the private domain). 
The following sections reference recent developments in South 
African jurisprudence regarding religious associational rights, more 
specifically pertaining to appointments by, and membership to, a 
religious association in relation to matters of the personal sexual 
conduct of such appointees or members. From this arises the 
proposal that religious associational rights pertaining to membership 
to, and appointments by, a religious association in the context of 
same-sex sexual conduct, be given sufficient autonomy. This also has 
implications for other forms of sexual conduct in the context of 
membership and appointments to religious associations. Not only is 
this argued for based on the importance of associational rights per se 
(and as referred to earlier), but also in the context of understanding 
religious reasons as substantially competitive with non-religious 
reasons regarding the matter of membership to, and appointments 
by, religious associations in the context of specific forms of sexual 
conduct as substantial criteria for a determination of whether such 
membership or appointments should be allowed by the respective 
religious associations. 
B. Religious Associational Rights and Sexual Conduct 
In Johan Daniel Strydom v. Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente 




 38. [2008] ZAEQC 1 (EqC) (S. Afr.). 
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was appointed as an independent contractor (organ teacher) by the 
respondent; namely, the “Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk” (Dutch 
Reformed Church) to teach music to students at the arts academy of 
the congregation. The church terminated Mr. Strydom’s services 
when it was discovered that he was involved in a same-sex 
relationship.39 Mr. Strydom instituted proceedings in terms of the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
(2000) against the church, as he was not an employee and he could 
therefore not proceed in terms of the Labour Relations Act (1995) or 
the Employment Equity Act (1998). The Equality Court found that 
the church had discriminated unfairly against Mr. Strydom and 
ordered the church to apologize to him, pay him R75000,00 for 
emotional suffering, pay him the balance of his contract for 2005 
amounting to R11970,00, and pay his legal fees. The church relied 
on section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (the right to freedom of religion40) to justify the 
“discrimination.” The respondents argued that the complainant was 
“a spiritual leader and as such cannot by way of his example of living 
in a homosexual relationship deliver his services as lecturer in music 
at the church’s [art academy]. In other words, as a role model the 
complainant was to follow an exemplary Christian lifestyle.”41 
According to Justice Basson, there was no convincing evidence 
presented by the church that the complainant was in a position of 
“spiritual leadership.”42 The Court also found that the complainant 
was not even a member of the church, was not an employee of the 
church (he was merely a contract worker) and therefore the 
complainant, according to the Court, “was . . . removed or 
distanced from the church, and did not even participate in its 
activities.”43 Also, the Court was of the view that: “The right to 
 
 39. Here it is important to note that the respondent omitted, when appointing the 
applicant, to make it clear that same-sex sexual conduct is in opposition to the tenets of the said 
church. This was emphasized in Strydom. However, this does not form the crux of this 
investigation, rather, the question is as to how far a religious institution may go regarding 
appointments and membership, and in this regard, Strydom allows for furtherance of the debate. 
 40. CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. OF 1996, ch. 2, § 15, available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf (“Everyone has the right to 
freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”). 
 41. Strydom, [2008] ZAEQC at ¶ 16. 
 42. Id. at ¶ 17. 
 43. Id. at ¶ 20. Justice Basson added that: “There is also not a shred of evidence that the 
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equality of the complainant must . . . be balanced against the 
freedom of religion of the church”44 and that 
The question remains whether the right to religious freedom 
outweighs the Constitutional imperative that there must not be 
unfair discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation? The 
Constitutional right to equality is foundational to the open and 
democratic society envisaged by the Constitution. As a general 
principle therefore, the Constitution will counteract rather than 
reinforce unfair discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation.45 
South African scholarship resulting from the Strydom case is 
comprised basically of three main streams of thought. Firstly, there 
is the view that a church should accommodate those who practice 
same-sex sexual conduct due to an understanding of equality as 
uniformly supportive in this regard. According to this view, no 
matter what the nature of the functions to be exercised by an 
appointment, a church should appoint a person who practices same-
sex sexual conduct.46 In this regard it is argued that, for example, it 
seems clearly justifiable for a Christian community to refuse to 
employ a Jewish or Muslim minister, or any person who does not 
profess the faith of that community, and this, says David Bilchitz, is 
 
complainant wanted to influence the students or any other church member. In fact, he wanted to 
keep his homosexual relationship to himself as he regarded it as a private matter.” Id. at ¶ 22. 
See also id. at ¶ 17. This led Justice Basson to come to the conclusion that “it would not have 
been devastating to the church to keep the complainant on in his teaching position.” Id. at ¶ 23. 
From this it can be deduced that according to Justice Basson, where a religious association 
appoints someone who is not “distanced” from the relevant religious community or church (and 
which consequently has the power to exert some sort of influence on the members of the 
religious institution), then such a church should have the freedom to exclude such a person 
from membership or services to the church. 
 44. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 45. Id. at ¶ 14. Although being sensitive to the church’s authority to determine whom to 
appoint when it comes to religious duties or functions related to spiritual leadership, Justice 
Basson here implies that the prohibition of unfair discrimination due to sexual orientation (as 
inferred from the “equality” clause in the Constitution) should be elevated to a more superior 
norm than that of the right of a religious association to have absolute freedom to appoint whom 
it wishes. The credibility of this type of reasoning when compared to the reasoning of a religious 
association in the context of its religious ethos is critically addressed in the second part of this 
article. 
 46. In this regard, Bilchitz’s argument is not confined only to being supportive towards 
appointments by religious associations of those who practice same-sex sexual conduct but also 
to membership of religious associations. 
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based on the idea of “religius leadership.” However, according to 
Bilchitz, “[t]his is a different matter altogether from refusing to 
employ a . . . gay individual as a minister where such individual 
belongs to such a community, professes its beliefs and identifies 
with that community.”47 Bilchitz also strongly relies on “biological 
inherency” as reason for being orientated towards participating in 
same-sex sexual conduct and that it is therefore not based solely on 
choice.48 Bilchitz uses biological inherency in furthering the claim 
that religious associations may not prohibit membership or 
appointments even where such conduct is in opposition to the core 
tenets of such an association. 
Secondly, there is the view that religious institutions should not 
be forced to appoint persons practicing same-sex sexual conduct, 
where such persons are expected to perform a “core function” within 
such an institution. When a church wants to appoint someone who 
practices same-sex sexual conduct, and such an appointment is not 
aligned with a core function in the church (such as a secretary for 
example), then such a person needs to be accommodated.49 In this 
regard, Patrick Lenta refers to “economic opportunity” as a reason 
for allowing persons to be appointed by religious associations when 
such appointments entail functions that are not linked to the core 
tenets or to spiritual leadership of the religious association.50 
Thirdly, there is the view that a religious association represents a 
unique and important ethos (especially and foremost to its 
members), and that membership to such an ethos requires one to 
adhere to the core tenets of such an institution irrespective of the 
functions to be performed by a member or an appointee. Here it is 
argued that the way we think of our bodies and the purposes for 
which our bodies are to be used (including sexual activities) are 
 
 47. David Bilchitz, Should Religious Associations Be Allowed to Discriminate?, 27 S. AFR. J. 
HUM. RTS. 219, 246 (2011). According to Bilchitz, a law that prevents a religious group from 
discriminating on grounds of sexual-orientation should be defended. Id. at 240. 
 48. See, e.g., id. at 231. 
 49. See Patrick Lenta, Taking Diversity Seriously: Religious Associations and Work-Related 
Discrimination, 126 S. AFR. L.J. 827–60 (2009). Interesting is that Lenta here also argues that, 
contrary to Justice Basson’s view in the Strydom judgment, even teaching music is related to 
spiritual influence in the church and can therefore be understood as constituting a religious 
function or function of spiritual leadership in the church. 
 50. See id. at 859. 
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inextricably connected to morally-based predilections.51 It is also as 
a result of the central meaning that marriage has for many,52 that 
sexual activity is such a central issue and core doctrine to many 
believers, religious believers and religious associations.53 A society 
seeking the protection and furtherance of “identity” and “diversity” 
needs to accommodate morally-based predilections regarding sexual 
activity in the private sphere, which includes the religious 
association. In this regard, an argument is also made for an approach 
to appointments by religious associations, based on “religious ethos” 
which does not necessarily exclude those functions that on the face 
of it seem to be “distanced from religion” or “excluded from the 
domain of spiritual influence or leadership.” How we perceive of 
“distance” and “spiritual leadership” is in itself a matter of religious 
interpretation sacred to the relevant collective belief. In other words, 
the status of functions in a religious association that may, on the 
face of it, appear to be distanced from spiritual leadership and core 
doctrine, might in fact not be so on closer inspection. For example, 
Alvin Esau explains that: 
[U]nder the organic view of employment the employee is expected 
to participate in the mission of the organization as a whole, and is 
expected to join the whole community, the whole body, in a way 
that transcends any narrowly defined job description. . . . [t]he 
workplace itself constitutes a community of believers where 
relationships are as important, if not more so, than narrowly 
defined role tasks. . . . When you focus instrumentally on a role 
you might well conclude that the religious organization should not 
be allowed to discriminate on religious grounds when hiring 
kitchen staff as opposed to professors. However, when you shift  
 
 
 51. See Shaun A. de Freitas, Freedom of Association as a Foundational Right: Religious 
Associations and Strydom v. Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente Moreleta Park, 28 S. AFR. J. 
HUM. RTS. 258 (2012). 
 52. Marriage “also includes organic bodily union. This is because the body is a real part of 
the person, not just his costume, vehicle, or property. Human beings are not properly 
understood as nonbodily persons—minds, ghosts, consciousnesses—that inhabit and use 
nonpersonal bodies. . . . Because persons are body-mind composites, a bodily union extends 
the relationship of two friends along an entirely new dimension of their being as persons.” Sherif 
Girgis, Robert P. George & Ryan T. Anderson, What is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
245, 253 (2011). 
 53. See also TRIGG, supra note 3, at 96. 
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your perspective to the organic view, . . . relationships rather than 
roles are to a degree the point of the enterprise.54 
This emphasizes “membership” of a religious institution as an 
important factor, irrespective of the task expected of such a person— 
the person (employee or independent contractor) is invited into a 
relationship and into membership with the group,55 and on 
obtaining membership, the person becomes inextricably related to 
the religious ethos of the relevant group which has a core relational 
understanding encompassing it. This understanding of 
“membership” (in the context of the organic model) is also of 
persuasive force to the members of such a congregation, and makes 
perfect sense to each such member.56 
The Strydom judgment brings to the fore debate related to the 
status of associational rights in South Africa, and in turn serves as a 
catalyst for a consideration of the status of religious associational 
rights in the context of appointments by, and membership to, 
religious associations, where specific forms of sexual conduct are in 
opposition to the core tenets of the religious association. In addition 
to credible pillars of support for associational rights, such as sphere 
sovereignty and the principle of subsidiarity, are valuable insights 
pertaining to the status of the law, the nature of pluralism and the 
relationship between the public and the private (as discussed above) 
that also enhance the importance of religious associational rights in 
the context of a substantial level of autonomy to be awarded to the 
activities of a religious association. 
An additional component in this regard is a critical analysis of 
the points of rationality used in debates related to the parameters of 
religious associational rights. For example, as mentioned above, 
David Bilchitz views the prohibition of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation as an encompassing norm that should be enforced 
on all religious associations in South Africa, irrespective of their core 
tenets. Patrick Lenta, on the other hand, aims at providing some sort 
 
 54. Alvin J. Esau, “Islands of Exclusivity”: Religious Organizations and Employment 
Discrimination, 33 U.B.C. L. REV. 719, 734 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. at 735. There can be many other examples—for example, the organic nature of a 
religious association reflected in the core doctrine and mission of such an association requiring 
the proclaiming of the Gospel to the world in all of the actions by all of its members. 
 56. Regarding further support of religious associations as “organic entities,” see Garnett, 
supra note 17, at 292. 
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of balance between the rights of the religious association and those 
of the individual, where “economic opportunity”57 serves as an 
important factor in trying to accommodate those persons who do not 
ascribe to the core tenets of the religious association from which 
they are seeking employment. An argument was also made for a 
higher degree of autonomy for a religious association in instances 
where the religious ethos of a specific religious institution requires 
it. From these three points of view, questions related to the 
persuasive force of each arise and therefore require further analysis. 
In the next section it will also be argued that the views of David 
Bilchitz and of Patrick Lenta (as representative of South African 
scholarship on the matter) reflect an assumed universality of rational 
persuasion which are in fact, not of universal persuasion. This in 
turn calls for a more accommodative approach to be taken towards 
the reasons given by a religious association for the way in which it 
functions. 
III. RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF REASON 
A. The Marginalization of Religious Language 
There is currently, in what is referred to as “post-secular” 
society, a growing realization that religion deserves its rightful place 
in public debate without having to sacrifice its own “language.” This 
is of relevance to the freedom that religious associations should have 
in qualifying their ways of functioning. Consequently, this improves 
the persuasive force of the religious language emanating from a 
religious association. Certain sectors in liberalism are coming to 
realize the subjectivity of discussions and reasoning clothed in so-
called “neutral” (non-religious) language. The norms essential to the 
sub-communities of interests within civil society are derived from 
foundational beliefs (whether religious or non-religious), which in 
turn represent what is rational to an individual believer or a group of 
believers.58 Liberalism’s privatization of religion, together with the 
strict separation between the private and the public, go hand-in-hand 
 
 57. See Lenta, supra note 49, at 859. 
 58. Roger Trigg criticizes Ronal Dworkin’s distinction between “faith” and “reason” in 
the sense that, according to Dworkin, faith (and therefore religion as well) cannot be rational. 
TRIGG, supra note 3, at 34, 142, 145. 
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with an understanding of reason as solely restricted to the public or 
to common consensus. This negates the credibility of forms of  
explanation emanating from groups of individuals sharing the same 
core religious beliefs and interests. 
Liberalist thinking in support of the strict separation between 
the private (also being the domain of religion) and the public (as 
excluding anything religious) ignores the fact that every individual 
and all groups of individuals sharing a foundational common interest 
are bearers and doers of some or other faith. It is not only religious 
people who have faith. In the words of Iain Benson, “[T]o make 
assumptions is to have faith of some sort.”59 The public sphere can 
therefore not escape practices of faith loyalties whether religious or 
non-religious (or secular). What also requires mentioning here is 
that science cannot tell us either why something exists or what the 
ultimate purpose of something is. The question of ultimate causes 
(or ends) is the jurisdiction of religion (and philosophy).60 Faith 
permeates all of reality, whether in education, scientific 
experimentations or in the observations of astronomers. Faith is 
exercised not only by the religious but also by the non-religious. 
Reason does not manufacture moral criteria ex nihilo—it needs 
something to work with.61 In other words, reason is ultimately 
based on some or other pre-suppositional or pre-rational point of 
belief that lies in the transcendental realm of things. This has 
implications for how we understand reason and the viability thereof. 
 
 59. Iain T. Benson, The Jurisdiction of Science: What the Evolution/Creation Debate is Not 
About, 3 J. FOR CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP 1, 3 (2007). 
 60. Id. at 21. 
 61. SMITH, supra note 3, at 153. Steven D. Smith goes on to show that concepts (such as 
“harm,” “equality,” “freedom,” and “human dignity” for example) are in many instances used by 
theorists to vindicate a certain point of view regarding a moral matter, where it is impossible for 
such conceptual view to escape subjectivity. Id. at 95. Smith explains for example that: “Liberals 
and others use the harm principle to argue for their favored positions on questions of individual 
freedom, often in the context of specific controversies over obscenity, regulation of sexual 
conduct, abortion, or similar issues. But, reversing directions, they also use their favored 
positions on issues of individual liberty to argue for understanding ‘harm’ in particular ways—
and for excluding from the category of ‘harm’ injuries that are in fact harmful in any ordinary 
sense not skewed to reach (or avoid) particular favored (or disfavored) conclusions.” Id. at 95. 
Applying this to the argument in this article, a concept such as “equality” is used by some 
scholars as a point of rationality in qualifying the accommodation by religious associations of 
certain forms of sexual conduct even where the practice of such sexual conduct is in opposition 
to the core tenets of such an association. This is dealt with in more detail below. 
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If faith permeates all of society (including the public) and if “fact” 
has a faith dimension to it and also permeates all of society, then 
reason is open to variation, depending on the specific religious and 
faith basis relevant to a given situation. Also, reasoning from a 
religious point of departure forms part of the dissemination of 
religious belief.62 This not only applies to the individual believer but 
also to a group of believers sharing the same core beliefs and 
interests. 
Accompanying the importance of the protection of associational 
rights is sensitivity towards the diversity of credible arguments on 
certain moral matters. This is especially the case where such moral 
matters form part of the core doctrine of a religious association. 
Questions related to the prohibition of appointments by, or 
membership to, religious associations of persons practicing same-sex 
sexual conduct concern one such moral matter. The protection and 
flourishing of civil society not only has to do with the protection and 
flourishing of specific interests shared and practiced by a group of 
believers, but also implies the accommodation of different forms of 
rationality in qualifying specific practices that are unique to a specific 
association. Liberalism’s staunch support of the public/private divide 
serves as a metaphor for the dividing line between reason and 
preference, where the public is understood as being governed by 
reason.63 Also, liberalism’s understanding of the individual as being 
“the elementary unit of explanation” has difficulty assimilating the 
religious other than in its individual dimensions.64 Added to this, 
religion falls on the private side of law’s conceptual divide, and once 
so accepted, religion is viewed as being bound to preference and not 
to reason. Consequently, religion is viewed as a matter of preference 
(or choice), and as such, an expression of the autonomous 
 
 62. See, e.g., Lund v. Boissoin, 2012 ABCA 300, at ¶ 64 (Can.) (“A moral statement 
arising out of religious conviction may, in some cases, be seen as the dissemination of religious 
belief.”). 
 63. PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 120–23 (2005). The public is also 
understood as the secular domain, which is viewed as a non-religious domain. In this regard, 
secular grounds need not be more reliable than religious ones especially when dealing with 
moral issues which are connoted to cultural grounds. Secular grounds can be corrupted as well. 
BRYAN T. MCGRAW, FAITH IN POLITICS: RELIGION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 101 (2010). Secular 
reasons can also come into conflict with one another. Id. at 102. 
 64. Berger, supra note 32, at 284–85. 
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individual.65 This has implications for how we understand the 
parameters of the religious association’s expressions of conviction  
and reason and whether a sense of reason should be excluded from 
the religious group. 
Jürgen Habermas refers to the “assumption of a common human 
reason [which] forms the basis of justification for a secular state that 
no longer depends on religious legitimation.”66 It is this assumption 
which, according to Habermas, makes the separation of state and 
church possible at the institutional level.67 This assumption of a 
common reason has dire implications for the justificatory weight 
stemming from religious modes of rationalization. The courts in 
many instances fuel this assumption in their analysis of the 
parameters of religious rights and freedoms. Habermas comments 
that “[i]n the liberal view, the state guarantees citizens freedom of 
religion only on the condition that religious communities, each from 
the perspective of its own doctrinal tradition, accept not only the 
separation of church and state, but also the restrictive definition of 
the public use of reason.”68 Many religious believers base their 
decisions concerning fundamental matters of justice on their 
religious convictions. The liberal state, which protects such forms of 
life in terms of a basic right, then cannot at the same time expect all 
citizens to justify their political statements independently of their 
religious convictions (or world views)69—“[t]he liberal state must 
not transform the requisite institutional separation of religion and 
politics into an undue mental and psychological burden for those of 
its citizens who follow a faith.”70 Religious dialogue and forms of 
reason have been subdued by the dominance of non-religious 
language in Western liberal and democratic societies. Also, the more 
theologians seek to find the means to translate theological 
convictions into terms acceptable to the non-believer, the more they 
 
 65. Id. at 309–10. 
 66. Jürgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14 EUR. J. PHIL. 1, 4 (2006). 
 67. Id. at 1. 
 68. Id. at 6. 
 69. Id. at 8. 
 70. Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted). Habermas states that the insight by secular citizens that 
they live in a post-secular society that is epistemically adjusted to the continued existence of 
religious communities in a post-secular society should include an understanding that their 
conflict with religious opinions is a “reasonably expected disagreement.” Id. at 15. 
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substantiate the view that theology has little of importance to say in 
the area of ethics.71 The result of this is also that religion is 
becoming more and more undifferentiated from other forms of 
belief. This has implications for the accommodation by the law and 
the authorities of a religious association’s justification for 
functioning in a certain manner. 
Stephen Carter comments that what is needed is not a 
requirement that the religiously devout choose a form of dialogue 
that liberalism accepts, but that liberalism accept whatever form of 
dialogue a member of the public offers. Carter warns that unless 
liberal theory and liberal law develop a way to welcome the 
religiously devout in public moral debate without first demanding 
that they make themselves into different people, liberalism will 
continue its slide from a pluralistic theory of politics to a narrow, 
elitist theory of right results, and damned be those who try to block 
the liberal path.72 To assume that people should discuss public 
policy based on shared moral premises is to assume that all 
worldviews share basic moral premises.73 According to Stanley Fish, 
liberalism is: 
[C]ommitted at once to allowing competing world views equal 
access to its deliberative arena, and to disallowing the claims of any 
one of them to be supreme, unless of course it is demonstrated to 
be at all points compatible with the principles of reason. . . . The 
one thing liberalism cannot do is put reason inside the battle where 




 71. Stanley Hauerwas, On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological, in THE HAUERWAS READER 
51, 69 (John Berkman & Michael Cartwright eds., 2001). In the words of Liliane Voyé, “Instead 
of speaking of ‘the laws of God,’ ‘the rules of the church,’ more and more frequently 
representatives of the Catholic Church refer to ‘human rights’ and to ‘human values,’ without 
mentioning a specific doctrinal background.” Liliane Voyé, Secularization in a Context of Advanced 
Modernity, 60 SOC. REL. 275, 278 (1999); see also RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND 
RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 173 (1983). Habermas goes so far as to state 
that religious citizens should be allowed to express and justify their convictions in a religious 
language if they cannot find secular “translations” for them. Habermas, supra note 66, at 9–10. 
 72. Stephen L. Carter, Lecture Two: The Establishment Clause Mess, 69 OR. L. REV. 495, 524 
(1990); see also Stephen L. Carter, Liberalism’s Religion Problem, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 2002), 
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/liberalisms-religion-problem-14. 
 73. Christine L. Niles, Epistemological Nonsense? The Secular/Religious Distinction, 17 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 561, 576 (2003). 
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where it could not succeed merely by invoking itself because its 
own status would be what was at issue.74 
Jonathan Chaplin is of the view that separate secular reasons for 
political views may not even be identifiable by religious believers, 
and the very attempt to formulate principles to govern political life, 
which can command the universal acceptance of all rational and 
reasonable citizens, is, after all, a hopeless task.75 John Rawl’s 
commitment to overlapping consensus does not do much to improve 
the integration of religious argument and consequent reasoning. 
Rawls’ account of overlapping consensus represents, in spite of 
Rawls’ disavowal of secularism, a commitment to an independent 
ethic of autonomy that has no place for religious convictions.76 
 
 74. Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn’t Exist, 36 DUKE L.J. 997, 997 (1987). Fish also states:  
If you tell a serious Christian that no one can walk on water, rise from the dead, or 
feed five thousand with two fishes and five loaves, he or she will tell you that the 
impossibility of those actions for mere men is what makes their performance so 
powerful a sign of divinity. For one party the reasoning is ‘No man can do it and 
therefore Christ didn’t do it’; for the other the reasoning is ‘Since no man could do it, 
he who did it is more than man.’ For one party falsification follows from the absence 
of a plausibly empirical account of how the purported phenomena could have 
occurred; for the other, the absence of a plausibly empirical account is just the point, 
one that does not challenge the faith but confirms it. 
Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
2255, 2279, 2291 (1997). See also Carter, supra note 72, at 523. Carter also states, “It is a 
commonplace of public dialogue in our current era—at least among elites—to treat religionists 
working for change as presumptively fanatical, not amenable to reason. In the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the abolitionists, too, were described as fanatics.” STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S 
NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS 97 (2000). 
 75. Jonathan Chaplin, Beyond Liberal Restraint: Defending Religiously-Based Arguments in Law 
and Public Policy, 33 U.B.C. L. REV. 617, 640 (2000). See also RESCHER, supra note 9, at 10. 
 76. STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE STATE OF THE UNIVERSITY: ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGES AND THE 
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 176–77 (2007). On the one hand, Rawls believes that he is doing justice to 
the comprehensive character of differing fundamental views of life by seeking to build political 
agreement only on the “overlapping” consensus that exists among all of them. On the other 
hand, as Rawls moves toward the construction of that overlapping consensus, he argues that 
differing comprehensive views should “give way in public life” in order to allow the common, 
political conception to become “freestanding.” What, according to James Skillen, finally becomes 
freestanding in Rawls’s construction, however, looks very much like something quite compatible 
with Rawls’s own comprehensive liberal view of life and not so much like something that 
overlaps comfortably with many other comprehensive religions and philosophies? James W. 
Skillen, The Theoretical Roots of Equal Treatment, in EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A 
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 55, 69 (Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998). See also 
SMITH, supra note 3, 14–15. 
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Public discourse, says Steven Smith, is impoverished because of the 
limitations emanating from secular rationalism which prevent an 
unveiling of fundamental normative commitments, which eventually 
results in a superficial discourse.77 These are but some of the 
indicators confirming that religious reasons for religious 
commitments are sidelined by the dominance of non-religious 
thinking and reasoning within Western liberalist societies. This has 
implications for how the religious association’s reasons for acting in 
certain ways are understood. 
B. Religious Associations and Reason 
The question that arises against the background of appointments 
by, or appointments to, religious associations in the context of those 
who practice same-sex sexual conduct (which is in opposition to the 
core tenets of such an association) is the following: At what point 
will freedom of association and religious liberty have to give way to 
the right to freedom from discrimination? Stated otherwise: When 
does the freedom to associate (or the right to religious practice and 
expression) guarantee a legitimate right to discriminate? In 
beginning to answer this, it may be possible to postulate some or 
other universally rational and coherent explanation. However, the 
rational aspect will soon begin to mutate into different forms of 
rationality. Who would disagree with the view that many religious 
and non-religious believers, cultures and religious associations in 
South Africa (and elsewhere) have, as part of their core belief, 
requirements pertaining to sexual conduct that are inextricably 
connected to foundational views on marriage, family, child-rearing 
and purpose in life? Human rights jurisprudence supports the 
sacredness of the human body, the protection of which is prioritized 
by human rights instruments around the world. Irrespective of race, 
creed or culture, the living (and dead) human body is sacrosanct. 
The creeds of, for example, the mainstream religions in South Africa 
are in agreement with this. Questions as to how and for what 
purposes we use our bodies are therefore of fundamental concern 
and naturally overlap with our foundational beliefs and consequently 
also with our right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion. 
 
 77. SMITH, supra note 3, at 211, 215, 218. 
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     The autonomy of religious associations and their independence 
from the state are vital to a conscience-honoring social order. The 
state’s interference therefore should be limited to protecting 
vulnerable members from readily discernible, serious harm (for 
example, physical or sexual abuse of a child, or financial fraud by 
church officials), not from moral claims that the political community 
rejects.78 The manner in which we use our bodies (including sexual 
activities) overlaps with our individual identity, introducing the 
relevance of this for the fruition of our human dignity. The way we 
think of our bodies and the purposes for which our bodies are to be 
used (including sexual activities) according to each of our beliefs, 
overlaps with our moral views on the matter (whether driven by 
genetic influences or not)—moral views which differ from believer to 
believer and from group of believers to group of believers. Genetic 
reasons for sexual arousal are not limited to reasons for same-sex 
sexual conduct but apply to other types of sexual conduct as well. 
This however does not rid forms of sexual conduct from loyalty to 
specific moral positions for the reason already explained.79 If same-
sex sexual conduct is enforced upon society then why should other 
types of sexual conduct such as “an affiliation of someone in age-
minority and someone in age-majority who claim the right to be 
equal and therefore married in spite of current prohibitions on age 
limitations”80 (to name only one example) not be enforced on 
society? Here too reasons provided for having same-sex sexual 
conduct enforced upon society whilst supporting a prohibition 
against marriage between someone who is in age-minority and 
 
 78. ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE 
BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 308 (2010). 
 79. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, 2000 BCCA 519, at ¶ 20 (Can.) 
(“Some aspects of human sexuality remain morally controversial including homosexual or ‘same 
sex’ relationships. The division of moral conviction on this subject cuts across society and 
divides religious communities as well as people of no religious persuasion. The moral position of 
some on all sides of particular issues will be influenced by their religion, others not. There is no 
bright line between a religious and non-religious conscience. Law may be concerned with 
morality but the sources of morality in conscience are outside of the law’s range and should be 
acknowledged from a respectful distance.”). 
 80. Robert J. Araujo, Same-Sex Marriage—From Privacy to Equality: The Failure of the 
“Equality” Justifications for Same-Sex Marriage, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER 
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 195, 203 (Scott FitzGibbon et al. eds., 2010). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/29/2014 9:52 AM 
421 Religious Associational Rights and Sexual Conduct in South Africa 
 447 
someone who is in age-majority will not be accepted by everyone in 
society. Sensitivity and an accommodative approach regarding 
differing moral opinions on the body against the background of 
sexual conduct is reflected in South African legislation that even 
allows for marriage officers, for example, not to serve before 
marriages between same-sex couples when such officers 
conscientiously object to doing so. In this regard, there should be a 
fair amount of agreement81 amongst competing forms of belief and 
religion regarding the differences of opinion on acceptable forms of 
sexual conduct; but as the debate develops, so do the possibilities of 
disagreement, and this despite efforts towards avoiding 
disagreement. It is at this stage that one needs to become attentive 
towards the different forms of reasoning. In what follows are three 
examples of where the religious association’s conviction that 
membership and appointments to itself should conform to its core 
tenets pertaining to sexual conduct (otherwise such membership and 
appointments will be prohibited) is opposed along lines of language 
that assumes universal rationality.82 
The first example is that of “biological inherency.” Here the 
reasoning is that because one is born with an inherent attraction to 
persons of the same sex, a religious association may not prohibit 
such a person from being a member of a religious community where 
such a person practices same-sex sexual conduct and where such 
conduct is in opposition to the core tenets of a religious association. 
 
 81. But even here there can be disagreement. For example, those who view the 
prohibition of discrimination due to sexual orientation as an encompassing norm to be applied 
by religious associations as well will already disagree at this stage with the rationale provided for 
in the above. Likewise, there might be those religious associations whose members would 
directly resort to religious language regarding a justification for the approach taken by such an 
association in prohibiting membership to someone due to the latter’s conduct resulting from his 
or her specific form of sexual orientation. The importance of this is elaborated upon below in the 
context of Alvin Esau’s “organic model” as an example. 
 82. Note here the similarities when referring to South African scholarship on religious 
associational rights in the context of sexual conduct, where we find parallels to the examples of 
assumed universal rationality grounded in “biological inherency,” “possibilities of employment,” 
and “equality understood as an encompassing norm prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.” More specifically, as stated earlier, David Bilchitz assumes that equality should 
include the encompassing norm of prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
relies strongly on the “biological inherency” of sexual orientation as countering discrimination 
resulting from this. Patrick Lenta on the other hand places the emphasis on practical 
considerations related to “economic opportunity” and therefore that employment figures be 
considered as well. 
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This is an example of what Stephen Carter refers to as matters of 
empirical morality, meaning that which is couched in terms of appeal 
to values so overarching that no one would dispute them. Moral 
dialogue of this type seems easier for liberal courts to accept, where 
the judge is not supposed to impose her own moral judgments, but 
she can certainly manage the facts.83 Carter explains, by way of an 
example, that empirical morality is viewed as the effort by the gay 
rights movement to portray homosexuality as innate rather than 
chosen. The innateness claim has the advantage of inviting equal 
protection scrutiny of restrictions on conduct that can be seen as 
disadvantaging a particular sexual preference. However, says Carter, 
as a constitutional (or for that matter a moral) issue it is difficult to 
see why it ought to matter whether sexual preference is a choice or 
whether it is something innate.84 
Such rationality relying on biological inherency does not take 
cognizance of other rational approaches emanating from other 
foundational points of belief. As explained earlier, human rights 
jurisprudence supports the sacredness of the human body, the 
protection of which is prioritized by human rights instruments 
around the world. Irrespective of race, creed or culture, the living 
(and dead) human body is sacrosanct. Questions as to how and for 
what purposes we use our bodies are therefore of fundamental 
concern and naturally overlap with our foundational beliefs and 
consequently our right to freedom of religion, belief, and opinion. 
This means that biological inherency as reason for specific forms of 
conduct can be trumped by other forms of reasoning.85 
These different reasons in justifying or prohibiting certain types 
of conduct also lurk beneath the balancing efforts to be found 
between conflicting rights.86 A second example of where non-
 
 83. Carter, supra note 13, at 481–82. 
 84. Id. at 483. 
 85. There are also other forms of criticism that can be added to this, for example, whether 
the assumed rationality of biological inherency trumps forms of reasoning that support the 
organic model of associational loyalties such as that which Alvin Esau refers to. See Esau, supra 
note 54, at 734. In other words, how persuasive is this application of biological inherency when 
compared to other forms of reasoning? 
 86. Needless to say, where there is a serious violation of a human right, such as the 
taking of life or the exercise of physical (or psychological) harm or the threat of taking a life or of 
causing physical (and psychological) harm, then the reasons as to what right should be 
prioritized involves a simpler determination as to which right should be prioritized. 
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religious reasons are viewed as trumping religious reasons pertaining 
to membership or appointments to a religious association is the 
following: Looking at the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights (“ECtHR”) pertaining to decisions taken by the 
German labor courts related to sexual conduct and the consequent 
dismissal by church institutions of persons that conducted 
extramarital relations, Van der Vyver observes that the ECtHR 
judgments added a particular dimension to the principles that 
Germany is required to demand of its labor courts; namely, the 
effects of dismissal of an employee, for whatever reason, on the 
personal and family life of the employee, among other things.87 In 
this regard, the question needs to be asked as to what, from a 
rational point of view, trumps “personal and family life,” for 
example, over that of the religious rights and right to human dignity 
of the members of a religious institution as well as the associational 
rights of such an institution?88 In Schüth v. Germany89 the ECtHR 
pertinently stated that: 
[T]he fact that an employee dismissed by an ecclesiastical employer 
has limited possibilities of finding new employment is decisive. 
This is all the more significant where the employer holds a 
dominant position in a given sector . . . or where the training of a 
dismissed employee bore such a specific nature that it would be 
difficult if not impossible for him to find new employment outside 
of the church.90 
Here, “family related concerns” (concerns related to privacy) and 
the “limited possibility of finding new employment,” form part of 
the reasons given by the ECtHR so as to uphold the employment of 
an employee in a religious association. This reasoning therefore 
 
 87. Van der Vyver, supra note 7, at 8. More specifically, these involved disputes related to 
dismissal by church institutions of persons who had conducted extramarital relationships. 
 88. In this regard, Roger Trigg comments that the right to respect for privacy trumped 
any right a religious institution had to demand that its employees live by its principles:  
This demand for equal respect, and recognition of equal dignity, ensures that 
institutions have little say, even in ensuring that their teaching is observed by their 
own employees. The result is that there is no respect for the particular ethos of a 
church or other religious institution, and indifference as to whether a religion can 
continue to uphold its principles through example and teaching. 
TRIGG, supra note 3, at 120. 
 89. (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 32 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts.). 
 90. Id. at ¶ 73. 
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overrides the religious association’s opposition to extramarital 
sexual conduct by its members or employees. The question arising 
from this is whether such reasons presented by the ECtHR should 
trump the reasoning of the church, which in this case involves the 
“entering into a marriage void within the understanding of the faith 
and Canonic Code of the Church”?91 However, what rationally  
trumps the “limited possibility of finding new employment” over 
that of the associational rights of a religious association?92 
A third example of assumed universal rationality is that 
regarding the concept of “equality” and its assumed qualification of 
an encompassing application of the prohibition of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. An example of this is Justice Basson’s 
finding in the Strydom judgment that the South African 
Constitution’s right to equality is foundational to the open and 
democratic society envisaged by the Constitution, and therefore that, 
as a general principle, the Constitution should counteract rather 
than reinforce unfair discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation.93 Kent Greenawalt points to problems of understanding 
arising from the puzzling nature of equality, one of them being the 
“uncertainty among lawyers and judges about the significance of 
legal norms formulated in the language of equality.”94 Religion is an 
equality right itself and religious people are entitled to non-
discriminatory treatment in terms of their religion as well. Placing 
equality and non-discrimination over against religion, or viewing 
some forms of non-discrimination (say, same-sex sexual conduct) as 
 
 91. Id. at ¶ 38. 
 92. Here again added criticism can be added; for example, how persuasive will this 
argument be to those who are persuaded by the belief and consequent rationality connected to 
viewing heterosexual sexual conduct and marriage as a Godly sacrament? Also, how will the 
argument supporting “possibilities of employment” rationally override the interests related to 
Alvin Esau’s organic model? See Esau, supra 54 at 734–35. 
 93. Strydom, [2008] ZAEQC at ¶ 14. As explained above, the Strydom judgment 
emphasized the superiority of the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation 
where the appointment made by a religious association is not connected to a core religious 
function or to spiritual leadership within such an association. This however, does not negate the 
strong message by Justice Basson in support of the prohibition of unfair discrimination due to 
sexual orientation as an encompassing norm. 
 94. Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1167 
(1983). For different conceptions on equality, including equality as the right to flourish, see 
Robert J. Araujo, What is Equality? Arguing the Reality and Dispelling the Myth: An Inquiry in a Legal 
Definition for the American Context, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 113, 169–70 (2009). 
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more important than the religious person’s freedom to disagree with 
the associational acceptance of same-sex sexual conduct, is 
questionable. Roger Trigg asks: “How is it that we now believe in 
Western democracies in the equality of all, when many in the 
contemporary world still do not? It may be a constituent belief of 
democracy, but what justifies it?”95 Trigg then adds that 
acknowledgment of equality need not imply uniform treatment.96 
Robert Araujo states 
[W]e often hear claims made about “inclusiveness” that are 
deemed essential by some advocates to make each person “equal” 
with all others, notwithstanding the diversity that differentiates 
among them in some significant ways. This kind of equality, 
however, tends to be contrived. . . . The argument for these 
equalities is false and unsustainable because it removes the claim to 
equality from the two foundational pillars of fact and the 
transcendent or metaphysical nature of the human person. It 
represents an attempt to do away with distinction and 
employs . . . a misuse of the law that grants a license to equality 
in spite of what reason and reality declare that it is not.97 
Trigg also states, “Discrimination in favour of religious views 
will seem as unacceptable as discriminating against some other 
group. Yet, although ‘discrimination’ has become a powerful label 
for unacceptable behaviour, it is worth remembering that every 
 
 95. TRIGG, supra note 3, at 2. 
 96. Id. at 4. Justice Albie Sachs formerly of the Constitutional Court of South Africa:  
[E]quality should not be confused with uniformity; in fact, uniformity can be the 
enemy of equality. Equality means equal concern and respect across difference. It does 
not pre-suppose the elimination or suppression of difference. Respect for human 
rights requires the affirmation of self, not the denial of self. Equality therefore does 
not imply a levelling or homogenisation of behaviour but an acknowledgment and 
acceptance of difference.  
Nat’l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, [1998] ZACC 15, at ¶ 132 
(CCT) (S. Afr.). Stuart Woolman refers to the South African Constitutional Court’s view in 
Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education that the essence of equality under the 
South African Constitution is that “we treat everyone with equal concern and respect,” 
Woolman responding that this is “just a fancy way of saying that we need not all act the same 
way in order to enjoy the benefits—including the associational benefits—of a liberal 
constitution.” WOOLMAN, supra note 23, at 64. 
 97. Araujo, supra note 94, at 170. In similar fashion Roger Trigg comments that “[s]ecular 
thinking, caught up with issues concerning equality and non-discrimination, treats its own views 
as superior to those of any religion.” TRIGG, supra note 3, at 133. 
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rational judgement, and indeed every moral judgement, involves 
discriminating between relevant and irrelevant factors.”98 This gives 
discrimination a wider, more acceptable tone, where differences in 
rational approaches inherently exclude or discriminate against one 
another as a result of differences in belief. Therefore, to assume that 
the prohibition of unfair discrimination due to sexual orientation 
trumps a religious association’s reasoning in support of the 
sacredness of heterosexual marriage is erroneous. 
In the examples above where “biological inherency,” 
“possibilities of unemployment,” and “equality understood as 
including the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation” are used as assumed rational points in countering the 
upholding of the associational rights of a religious institution (and 
the religious rights and rights to human dignity of its members), the 
question remains as to whether these examples rationally override 
other (including religious) forms of persuasion. The answer to this is 
surely not in the affirmative. 
The first part of this article referenced three main streams of 
thought arising from South African jurisprudence pertaining to the 
parameters of a religious association in allowing membership or 
appointments to itself in the context of forms of sexual conduct that 
are in opposition to such an association’s core tenets. In this regard, 
David Bilchitz’s reliance on the prohibition of unfair discrimination 
based on sexual orientation as an encompassing norm and his 
inclusion of “biological inherency” so as to support this view, and 
Patrick Lenta’s reliance on “economic opportunity” were critically 
investigated in the second part of this article against the background 
of assumed rational qualifications emanating from sources external 
to that of the religious association itself. From this, the question 
arises of whether reasons presented by a religious association, such 
as that of Esau’s organic model, are to be subordinated to opposing 
reasons based on, for example, biological inherency, the 
accommodation of sexual orientation as an encompassing norm, 
economic opportunity, opportunities of employment, and privacy. 
The ideal towards persuasion in obtaining harmony amongst 
individuals and entities within civil society should not imply 
uniformity of persuasion, due to the fact (and as explained in the 
 
 98. TRIGG, supra note 3, at 4. 
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above) that there are different forms of language (religious and non-
religious) and reasoning in society which justify certain modes of 
operation and functioning by individuals and groups sharing the 
same interests in society. 
Specifically focusing on the accommodation of same-sex sexual 
conduct by a religious association whose core doctrine is in 
opposition to such conduct, it was argued along the lines of general 
persuasion that such accommodation should be allowed due to the 
central role that sexual relationships play in our existence and 
purpose in life. This in itself provides a reasoned argument that 
should appeal to society in general (which in turn should allow the 
necessary autonomy to religious associations in deciding its 
approach). This reasoned argument is further enhanced by 
questioning the rationality of certain non-religious points of view 
(such as biological inherency) when compared to some religious 
points of view (such as that which arises from the organic model). 
The rationality of the religious foundational ethos illustrated, in for 
example, Alvin Esau’s organic model cannot be overridden by a 
perceived to be universally persuasive form of rationality (based on a 
non-religious pre-rational point of departure) and therefore should 
not be assumed to be less rational than other non-religious 
reasoning pertaining to important moral beliefs (provided of course 
that the public peace and order, as well as the fundamental tenets 
related to the protection of human dignity are not violated). These 
two forms of reasoning support a religious association’s right to 
prohibit membership or appointments of persons who participate in 
same-sex sexual conduct, where such conduct is in opposition to 
such a religious association’s core doctrine. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article argues for the prioritization of religious associational 
rights as well as a better understanding of reason inherent to a 
religious association (and which is of consequent persuasion to the 
members of such association). This takes place against the 
background of recent developments in South African jurisprudence, 
specifically concerning membership and appointments to a religious 
association in the context of a certain form of sexual conduct that is 
opposed to the core tenets of such an association. Recent scholarship 
in South Africa is reflective of different and sometimes contrasting 
views. The view taken by this article is one which supports the 
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awarding of a proper level of autonomy to a religious association in 
deciding on the acceptance or rejection of certain forms of sexual 
conduct, where same-sex sexual conduct is the specific focus. In 
addition to emphasizing the importance of religious associational 
rights, this article addressed different forms of reasoning (both 
religious and non-religious) regarding membership or appointments 
to religious associations of persons participating in same-sex sexual 
conduct. Here, this article presents both a reasoned argument that 
houses general appeal due to its reliance on the important role that 
certain forms of sexual conduct play in enhancing our sense of 
meaning and purpose for existence and an argument that questions 
the universal rationality of certain non-religious reasons that purport 
to have universal persuasion. This in turn establishes a more 
nuanced and accommodative understanding regarding religious 
reasons for prohibiting certain forms of sexual conduct when dealing 
with membership and appointments. 
Forms of belief (and consequent persuasion) in moral matters 
related to the acceptance or rejection of forms of sexual conduct are 
varied and, as stated earlier, in many instances directly opposed to 
one another. Underlying these forms of persuasion, whether 
religious or non-religious, are pre-suppositional or pre-rational 
points of departure that rest on some or other belief. These beliefs 
provide specific and differing interpretations of concepts such as 
equality, harm, freedom, and human dignity, and in turn, of whether 
certain forms of sexual conduct are acceptable or not. Therefore, 
religious associations should have a high level of autonomy in 
decisions on moral matters (in this case, matters related to same-sex 
sexual conduct) not only because of the idea that the right to 
freedom of association is a foundational norm but also due to the 
fact that the reasoning emanating from such associations are, on 
closer analysis, just as competitive as non-religious forms of 
reasoning. This in turn strengthens the autonomous nature that 
should accompany religious associations. Consequently, this will be 
constructive towards the furtherance of diversity in pluralist and 
democratic societies. Roger Trigg, in the context of discrimination 
on grounds of same-sex sexual conduct comments that neither side 
should assume the other to be so wicked that they have to be 
constrained by the law. The issue is not which side is right, but 
whether there is a genuine moral discussion to be had and whether a 
right to religious freedom must always be “trumped” by other 
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considerations.99 It is not only questions related to same-sex sexual 
conduct and its accommodation by religious associations that is at 
issue here, but other forms of sexual conduct as well, such as sexual 
conduct resulting from polygamous and pre-marital relationships, for 
instance. A more nuanced sense of autonomy for religious 
associations together with sensitivity towards the credibility of 
reasoning by religious associations (in opposition to allowing 
membership or appointments to those persons who practice sexual 
conduct which is in opposition to the core tenets of such an 
association) should assist in furthering the tenuous and challenging 
quest (which is laden with complexities) towards a fair balance in 
the conflict between the right to equal treatment and the right to 


























 99. Id. at 94. 
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